DIRECT EVIDENCE OF A PLAINTIFF'S INTENT TO REMAIN IS CRITICAL

Mitch D. Parsons

In Cole v McFarlin, et al, the Court of Appeals addressed a priority dispute focused on the question of the Plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff, Islah Cole, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on August 27, 2019. The police report identified Plaintiff’s address as 44189 Bayview Avenue, Apt 41312, Clinton Township MI 48038. The vehicle she was driving was insured by Allstate, which policy listed her parents as named insureds, and her parents’ address of 19658 Woodside St, Harper Woods, MI 49068 as the policy address.

Plaintiff initially filed suit against Allstate for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Allstate filed a motion for summary disposition arguing it was not in the order of priority because Plaintiff was not domiciled with her parents at the Woodside address. The trial court denied Allstate’s motion finding there was a question of fact regarding Plaintiff’s residency.

Plaintiff then applied for PIP benefits under the MACP and filed suit against the MAIPF. Plaintiff’s suit against the MAIPF was consolidated with her suit against Allstate. The MAIPF filed a motion for summary disposition arguing Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the MACP because she was covered by a policy with Allstate. Despite previously denying Allstate’s motion for summary disposition due to a question of fact, the trial court granted the MAIPF’s motion for summary disposition and stated that Allstate was highest in the order of priority for Plaintiff’s PIP claim.

After Allstate’s motion for reconsideration was denied, Allstate appealed. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in granting the MAIPF’s motion for summary disposition as a question of fact existed regarding Plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the accident.

When addressing the question of Plaintiff’s domicile, the Court of Appeals noted that a person’s residence, or the address at which a person says he lives at on a particular occasion does not establish a domicile. A Court must also consider the facts establishing where the person intends to remain. Citing the common-law definition of domicile from Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), the Court noted a domicile encompasses: (1) “the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” and (2) “the place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” (emphasis added).

The Court found that MAIPF’s motion for summary disposition relied on deposition testimony that failed to include any questioning regarding Plaintiff’s intent to remain at either her parents’ address, or her apartment on Bayview. During her deposition, Plaintiff was asked “what is your current address?” to which Plaintiff answered with her parent’s address. This testimony provided no direct evidence, however, of the second element of domicile, which is Plaintiff’s intention to remain in either place. Without direct evidence to support Plaintiff’s intention to remain at either residence, the Court held that a question of fact existed regarding where Plaintiff was domiciled at the time of the accident.