In Murphy v Myers and Barrett, et al, a recent unpublished decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s findings of negligence as to the plaintiff, James Murphy. Mr. Murphy was crossing four lanes of traffic, in a crosswalk, while in his motorized wheelchair when he was struck by a Lincoln MKC owned by Mr. Barrett and being operated by Ms. Meyers. Before the accident, Mr. Murphy had consumed alcohol with friends. He testified that when he entered the crosswalk, seven or eight vehicles were stopped at a red light in three of the four northbound lanes of traffic. He believed that after crossing two lanes of traffic there was still time left on countdown timer and no vehicles were stopped in the fourth lane.
Brandon Taylor was operating a vehicle stopped at the red light. He saw Mr. Murphy and felt that when Mr. Murphy entered the crosswalk he was “good to cross.” Mr. Taylor explained that while Mr. Murphy was crossing the street, the green countdown timer light changed to a flashing light, and then to a red light. Mr. Taylor saw the traffic light turn to green but Mr. Murphy was still in the crosswalk so Mr. Taylor did not start driving. He also looked in his rearview mirror and saw a vehicle in the fourth lane slow down as it approached the intersection, but then speed up when the light turned green. That vehicle struck Mr. Murphy.
The responding police officer spoke to Mr. Taylor, Ms. Meyers, and Ms. Meyers’ passenger. The officer did not speak to Mr. Murphy. According to his hospital records, his blood alcohol content was 0.246. The officer found Mr. Murphy to be at fault for the accident.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that Mr. Murphy was more than 50% at fault and thus barred from recovery. In response, Mr. Murphy argued there was a genuine issue of fact as to the allocation of fault. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Defendants. The trial court found that Ms. Meyers was not negligent in her operation of her vehicle and that Mr. Murphy caused the accident. Mr. Murphy filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. An appeal followed.
Regarding Ms. Meyers’ negligence, the Court of Appeals found that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Murphy was visible in the crosswalk and that Ms. Myers could have avoided hitting Mr. Murphy. Even if Ms. Meyers’ view as obstructed, as speculative testimony suggested, it was still Ms. Myers’ duty to drive more slowly and keep her vehicle under such control that would allow her to stop immediately if the situation arose.
Regarding Mr. Murphy’s comparative negligence, the trial court concluded that he violated MCL 257.613, the statute governing when to cross at a crosswalk with pedestrian controls, and MCL 257.676b, the statute preventing pedestrians from blocking the flow of traffic. The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Murphy did not violate MCL 257.613, but may have violated MCL 257.613(2)(b) and MCL 257.676b. However, it was up to a jury to determine whether a violation was the proximate cause of the accident.
The dissent determined the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Ms. Meyers was not negligent. The dissent further noted that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Briggs v Knapp means that “until a hazard is perceived, or until a hazard would have been apparent to a reasonable man, considering pertinent surrounding circumstances of traffic and terrain, a driver has no duty to guard against or anticipate an unknown hazard.” In this case, the dissent found that as Ms. Meyers was approaching the intersection, Mr. Murphy was an unknown hazard who would not have been apparent to a reasonable person in her position.
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Sarah Nadeau, Editor of The Garan Report Publication, is a Shareholder in our Detroit Office. Sarah can be reached at 313.446.1530 or snadeau@garanlucow.com