QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUND REGARDING CAUSATION AND THRESHOLD INJURIES

Fiona E. Heady

In a recent, unpublished decision, Baskin v Namer and State Farm (Unpub COA No. 358176, 10/27/22), the Court of Appeals reversed a summary disposition granted to Defendant, Namer, analyzing a threshold injury, causation, comparative negligence and a sudden emergency.

The parties agree that Plaintiff entered the M10 freeway in December 2016 from the right, merged to the middle lane, then the left lane after checking his rearview mirror. The parties dispute whether Defendant’s vehicle had mechanical problems, was slowing or stopped/standing, or whether Defendant was in the left lane or shoulder when the accident occurred, and whether his hazards were on. Plaintiff was driving for a few seconds, did not see Defendant’s vehicle and rear-ended it. Plaintiff’s medical records indicate prior chronic back and neck pain complaints. Plaintiff suffered various facial fractures, hernia (surgery), concussion and memory loss, as well as the pre-existing degenerative changes. Two IMEs were conducted: one which concluded that maximum medical improvement had been reached quickly for “soft tissue injuries” and deferred on the concussion; and the other which concluded that significant injuries resulted, including exacerbation of degenerative conditions and post-concussive syndrome, from the MVA. Plaintiff filed suit against Namer for third party benefits and State Farm for UM/UIM. At his deposition he stated that he was able to return to work as a commercial truck driver without restrictions after 15 months.

Namer filed his MSD arguing that Plaintiff was more than 50% at fault and was presumed negligent under MCL 257.402(a) (rear-ending), and argued that Plaintiff did not establish a threshold injury. Plaintiff asserted a sudden emergency because he only saw the vehicle seconds before the crash and it did not have its hazards on. Plaintiff also argued that each of Namer’s violations of the traffic code created a question of fact for a jury as to each party’s proportion of negligence. The trial court determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to comparative negligence because of the dispute about where Namer’s vehicle was stopped and denied Plaintiff’s motion. The trial court also ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between Plaintiff’s injuries and the MVA, and therefore concluded that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a threshold injury and therefore granted Defendant’s MSD.

As to threshold and causation the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court finding that although there may have been a material issue of fact for the jury as to the exacerbation of the pre-existing conditions, there was NO issue of material fact that the accident caused the concussion and TBI suffered by Plaintiff. More interestingly, the Court corrected the trial court’s belief that the analysis of a threshold injury had any bearing on the causal link between the accident and Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. These two (2) analyses are distinct and separate. But again, relying upon Defendant’s IMEs, the Court found that the trial court impermissibly weighed the evidence of the two IMEs: while the first IME disagreed as to causation, the second IME found that Plaintiff’s injuries were definitely due to the MVA. The Court reaffirmed that no court is permitted to place greater weight on one piece of evidence or testimony than another when deciding an MSD. Such a dispute in the evidence creates an issue of fact for the trier of fact as to credibility (usually the jury).

In its analysis as to comparative negligence and the sudden emergency doctrine, the Court first noted the presumption of negligence against the driver who rear-ends another driver pursuant to MCL 257.402(a), but stated that this presumption may be overcome by the sudden emergency doctrine. White v Taylor Distrib. Co. Inc., 482 Mich 136, 139 (2008). In this case, the Court noted that a motorist experiencing trouble and stopping in a lane is not necessarily an unusual occurrence, however, due to the contrasting testimony discussed above, and the possibility that the Defendant may not have been “lawfully standing,” the Court found that it is possible a sudden emergency occurred, but that it remains a question of fact for the jury.