May 21, 2026
In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Popoff v Singh addressed whether the negligent driving of an individual resulting in a first collision was the proximate cause of a subsequent collision. In January 2023, Defendant Singh lost control of his vehicle and caused a three car pileup. All three vehicles came to rest in the right side ditch off the expressway. Police parked on the shoulder, demonstrating a crash. Other vehicles slowed down and merged to the left two lanes. Plaintiff, seeing the slow-down, stopped her vehicle on the left shoulder. She waited ten minutes before attempting to re-enter the left lane of traffic. Plaintiff was rear-ended by another vehicle, which had moved from the center lane to the left lane. Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result and filed a lawsuit against Defendant.
In addressing Defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the Circuit Court analyzed the issue of proximate cause between the initial and subsequent collision. The Court, relying upon Deaton by Deaton v Baker, 122 Mich App 252; 332 NW2d 457 (1982), and Derbeck v Ward, 178 Mich App 38; 443 NW2d 812 (1989), found the second collision was too far removed from Defendant’s negligence in the initial collision. While Plaintiff pulling over to the side of the expressway was a foreseeable result of the initial collision, Plaintiff’s decision to wait ten minutes before attempting to re-enter the expressway, and the other driver’s decision to merge left into Plaintiff’s lane were too attenuated to establish proximate cause.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Defendant’s negligence in operating his vehicle was a cause in fact of Plaintiff’s subsequent collision with the other driver and Plaintiff’s injuries. Relying upon Derbeck and Deaton, however, the Court concluded that Defendant’s negligence was only attributable to the original collision, and without more, was not enough to establish any proximate cause for the subsequent collision. If there is a clear break in the chain of causation such as an extended period of time or a new actor like in the present case, any ensuing action would be seen as too attenuated to impose any liability on the first act of negligence. In simpler terms, the Court emphasized that Defendant’s negligent actions following the initial collision may be the proximate cause of the second collision, but his alleged negligence in merely causing the initial collision could not be, and the latter is all the evidence supports in this case.
The Court further distinguished cases like Dillon v Tamminga, 64 Mich App 305; 236 NW2d 718 (1975), and Davis v Thornton, 384 Mich 138; 180 NW2d 11 (1970), in which the actions of Defendants’ were the direct cause of continued dangers that were attributed to later injuries. The Court noted that these two cases distinguished what direct actions would create hazardous and ongoing conditions, but in the present case, there is no comparable connection between Defendant’s negligence in operating his vehicle and the collision between Plaintiff and the other driver, such that the latter could be deemed a foreseeable consequence of the former for which Defendant should be legally responsible. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant.