Katrina White drove to the Wayne County Register of Deeds to pick up her daughter. Disregarding a sign that forbade her from doing so, White pulled her car into a designated bus stop lane that was situated parallel to the street in front of the building. With her foot on the brake pedal and her car still in gear, White waited as her daughter began entering White’s car. Just then, a government-owned bus attempted to pull into the bus stop lane in front of White’s car in order to drop off and pick up passengers. As it did so, the rear of the bus struck the side of White’s car, allegedly injuring White.
White filed a negligence claim against the government entity that owned the bus under the government-owned motor vehicle exception to Michigan’s governmental immunity statute. The government, however, asked the Circuit Court to summarily dismiss White’s negligence claim based on the government’s assertion that White had been negligent as a matter of law by violating MCL 257.674(1) of Michigan’s Vehicle Code, which prohibits “stopping or parking” a vehicle where an official sign forbids doing so. The Circuit Court agreed with the government and summarily dismissed White’s lawsuit, holding that as a matter of law White’s own negligence had caused the accident because White had “parked” her car in the bus stop lane in contravention to the warning sign.
But, in the published decision of White v Pace, the Court of Appeals disagreed and remanded the case back to the Circuit Court for trial.
The Court of Appeals first held that White was not “parked” for the purposes of MCL 257.674(1) because the Vehicle Code itself defines “parking” as “standing [(i.e., stopping)] a vehicle . . . when not loading or unloading . . . .” Since the government acknowledged that White was stopped in the bus lane because her daughter was in the process of “loading” into White’s vehicle, the Court of Appeals held that White was not “parked” and, thus, had not violated MCL 257.674(1). Therefore, White could not be deemed to have been negligent as a matter of law. Rather, a jury would need to determine whether White was negligent as a matter of fact for having ignored the warning sign and stopping in the bus stop lane (i.e., whether White’s action, although not prohibited by statute, was still nonetheless negligent).
The Court of Appeals then held that even if White had violated MCL 257.674(1) (or alternatively had violated a related city ordinance) and could be deemed to have been negligent as a matter of law, that fact still would not have warranted summarily dismissing White’s negligence claim. Instead, the Court of Appeals explained that a question of fact for the jury would still remain concerning how fault for the accident should be apportioned between White, for her negligence in improperly stopping in the bus stop lane, and the driver of the government-owned bus, for negligently striking White’s vehicle as he pulled the bus into the bus stop lane.
