The case of Timothy Lashbrook v Ila Grasak and Alissa Grasak raises important legal questions about suing deceased individuals. It also addresses the proper procedures for substituting estates in litigation.
Lashbrook arose from a motor vehicle accident, leading to the tragic deaths of the Defendants, Ila Grasak and Alissa Grasak. The Plaintiff, Timothy Lashbrook, later filed a lawsuit against the Defendants without naming their estates. The legal battle focused on whether the lawsuit could proceed without properly established estates. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the case. The appellate court affirmed this dismissal, emphasizing key legal principles governing service of process and party substitution. The following analysis details the facts of loss, trial court proceedings, and appellate evaluation of this case.
On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. He filed a Complaint on October 16, 2023, against Defendants who were both killed in the accident. Plaintiff’s Complaint named Defendants, not their estates, and in fact no estates existed at the time of filing the Complaint. On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a “Petition for Extension of Summons” wherein the Plaintiff indicated to the Court that after attempting to serve Defendants, he learned the Defendants were deceased. The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to extend the Summons 90 days to either “set up” estates for the deceased Defendants “and/or serve the Defendants’ insurer.
On January 3, 2024, counsel for Defendants filed a limited Appearance to request the court quash service of Plaintiff’s Complaint. They argued that Plaintiff knew or should have known that the Defendants died at the scene of the accident, as the police report stated that both were “pronounced [sic] deceased at the scene. Plaintiff continued to contend that he did not have actual knowledge that the Defendants died at the scene of the accident, but Plaintiff’s counsel admitted to having read the police report.
The trial court ruled from the bench that Plaintiff’s counsel was clearly aware that the named Defendants were deceased at the time of filing its Motion for Alternate Service. As a result, “Plaintiff’s counsel should have known that the only way service could ‘be proper was on the estate.'” Given there was no estate, alternate service could not “reasonably effectuate actual service on the proper defendant.” As a result, the Motion for Alternate Service was improper and should not have been granted. The trial court went on to find that the statute of limitations had expired and dismissed the case.
On appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) he should have been allowed to substitute the deceased Defendants’ estates pursuant to MCR 2.202(A); and, (2) the trial court shortened the statute of limitations by dismissing the case without giving Plaintiff time to create the estates for the deceased Defendants. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. First, the court noted:
This court in unpublished opinions has repeatedly interpreted the use of “natural person” in MCR 2.201(C)(1) to mean that “a deceased person cannot be sued as a matter of law.” Potter v Devine, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 20, 2013 (Docket No. 308878), p 4; Packard v Thomas, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2019 (Docket No. 344720), p 5. We conclude that the reasoning in Potter and Packard is sound and adopt it as our own to conclude that a deceased person like the named defendants here cannot be sued as a matter of law. (emphasis added).
The Lashbrook Court concluded that the Defendants were deceased and could not be sued as a matter of law. As a result, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action that was filed against the wrong parties.
The Court of Appeals further held that MCR 2.202(A) was not applicable in the instant case. The Defendants did not die during the course of the litigation. The trial court is given discretion to substitute the parties, i.e. it is not mandatory. Because the proper parties to replace the Defendants would have been their estates, an estate needed to be created for substitution. However, no estates had been established at the time of filing the lawsuit or seeking substitution, so there was no party to substitute.
