December 15, 2025
In Isovsa v Fitzpatrick, et al, Plaintiff Muzafer Isovska challenged the Circuit Court’s granting summary disposition in favor of three defendant insurers. Plaintiff is the mother of Brianna Isovska. They were co-registrants of a Ford Focus that was listed on a policy of insurance issued by Progressive. Brianna was the named insured on the Progressive policy. Plaintiff was the named insured on a policy of insurance issued by USA Underwriters (“USAU”) which listed only a Toyota Yaris. Plaintiff was operating the Focus when she was struck by defendant Leana Fitzpatrick. Plaintiff made a claim to her no-fault insurer, USAU, which was denied. Progressive denied coverage for Brianna and informed her that her policy was rescinded due to fraud or misrepresentation because she failed to list Plaintiff as a resident relative. Plaintiff then applied for PIP benefits through MAIPF which also denied coverage.
Plaintiff filed suit in Circuit Court for PIP and UM/UIM benefits and all three insurers moved for summary disposition. Regarding USAU’s motion, the Circuit Court granted the motion finding no genuine issue of material fact that USAU’s policy covered Plaintiff when she was driving the Toyota, that Plaintiff was driving the Focus at the time of the accident, and that the Progressive policy applies to the Focus. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the policy language in USAU’s PIP contract with Plaintiff was in direct contradiction to the No-Fault Statute, MCL 500.3114(1). Specifically, USAU’s policy language in “Exclusion D” limits coverage when bodily injury is caused by an accident involving “a motor vehicle you own or have registered in your name that is not an insured motor vehicle.” MCL 500.3114(1), however, states that a PIP policy applies “to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy” who is injured in a motor vehicle accident. (Emphasis added.) The Court affirmed that PIP coverage follows the insured person, not a vehicle, so “Exclusion D” is not valid and cannot be a basis to bar Plaintiff’s claim.
Regarding Progressive’s motion for summary disposition, the Court found genuine issues of material fact existed whether Plaintiff was an innocent third party to Brianna’s alleged fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining Brianna’s policy. Progressive asserted that Plaintiff was a co-registrant of the Focus and a resident relative of Brianna’s that stood to benefit from the alleged fraud or misrepresentation. The Circuit Court had granted Progressive’s motion based on those facts. The Court of Appeals vacated that decision finding the Circuit Court made an impermissible factual conclusion and remanded the matter back to the Circuit Court to balance the relevant equities before determining whether its policy may be rescinded, and to determine whether Plaintiff was an innocent third party. Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 410-11; 919 NW2d 20 (2018); Pioneer State Mut Ins Co, 331 Mich App 396, 411; 952 NW2d 586 (2020).
Regarding MAIPF’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s order granting summary disposition. The Court found that either the Progressive policy is not rescinded as to Plaintiff, rendering Progressive liable to pay Plaintiff’s PIP benefits, or the Progressive policy is rescinded as to Plaintiff, rendering USAU liable to pay Plaintiff’s PIP benefits. Therefore, both outcomes on remand would preclude liability on the part of the MAIPF.
Judge Korobkin issued a partial concurrence and dissent. He agreed that “Exclusion D” of USAU’s policy was invalid because it conflicts with MCL 500.3114(1). He disagreed with the Circuit Court’s decision regarding Progressive’s motion, however, opining that USAU cannot invoke “Exclusion E” to bar Plaintiff’s PIP claim regardless of whether Progressive’s rescission of its own policy as to Plaintiff was lawful. USAU is the highest-priority insurer so Progressive falls out of the picture.