January 21, 2026
Multiple motor vehicle collisions occurred during a chain reaction accident on the Southfield Freeway. During that chain reaction one of the motor vehicles struck a motorcycle operated by Walter Love. Love thereafter sought no-fault PIP benefits from the various insurance companies that insured the motor vehicles pursuant to MCL 500.3114(5), which in relevant part provides that first in priority to pay PIP benefits to a motorcyclist “who suffers accidental bodily injury arising from a[n] . . .accident that shows evidence of the involvement of a motor vehicle” is the “insurer of [an] owner or registrant of [a] motor vehicle involved in the accident,” followed by various other potential insurers.
Lashawn Rudolph owned a motor vehicle that was insured by Auto Club Group Insurance Company (“Auto Club”). At least some of the evidence indicated that the motor vehicle owned by Rudolph caused the first collision in the chain, and thus that Rudolph’s vehicle was “involved in the accident.” Accordingly, Auto Club did not dispute that MCL 500.3114(5) arguably places Auto Club first in priority to pay any PIP benefits to which Love may be entitled.
But, Auto Club asserted that it is removed from the order of priority by MCL 500.3114(6), which states that “[i]f an applicable insurance policy in [the] order of priority under subsection (5) is a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under [MCL 500.]3107d, or as to which an exclusion under [MCL 500.]3109[a](2) applies, [then] the injured person shall claim benefits only under other policies . . . .”
Specifically, Auto Club introduced evidence that when applying for her policy Rudolph had been presented with a form providing for various “options” with respect to PIP coverage, and that Rudolph had selected “Option 4: Limited Coverage of $250,000, with some or all persons excluded from PIP allowable expenses coverage.” In connection therewith, Rudolph had listed herself as the only “Excluded Person” for the purposes of Option 4.
Auto Club thus moved for summary disposition, arguing that Rudolph’s having selected Option 4 rendered MCL 500.3114(6) applicable, thus removing Auto Club from the order of priority of no-fault insurers potentially liable to pay any PIP benefits to which Love may be entitled. However, the Circuit Court disagreed and denied Auto Club’s request for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that denial in the recently published decision of Love v Rudolph, __ Mich App __; __ NW3d __ (2025).
The Court of Appeals first held that Rudolph’s policy was not “a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d[.]” That is, by selecting “Option 4” Rudolph had not “elected not to maintain coverage for [PIP] benefits.” Instead, Rudolph had merely elected a limit of $250,000 in allowable expense PIP benefit coverage, and excluded only Rudolph herself from such coverage. Moreover, the Court of Appeals further noted that Rudolph in fact could not have made an election not to maintain allowable expense PIP coverage pursuant to MCL 500.3107d. This is because Auto Club admitted that Rudolph did not have “qualified health coverage,” being health coverage under Medicaid Parts A and B, which MCL 500.3107d(1) expressly requires in order for an insured to elect not to maintain allowable expense PIP coverage under MCL 500.3107d(1).
The Court of Appeals then similarly held that Rudolph’s policy was not “a policy . . . as to which an exclusion under [MCL 500.]3109[a](2) applies[.]”[1] Specifically, the Court of Appeals noted that MCL 500.3109a(1) expressly provides that any exclusion under MCL 500.3109a(2) “must apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the policy, the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same household.” Thus, not only had Rudolph not even attempted by choosing Option 4 to exclude non-relatives such as Love from claiming allowable expense PIP benefits from Auto Club, but in fact Rudolph could not have done so by selecting Option 4.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that MCL 500.3114(6) does not apply to remove Auto Club from the order of priority set forth by MCL 500.3114(5), and thus does not entitle Auto Club to summary disposition. Rather, Auto Club will remain within the order of priority unless a jury determines that the motor vehicle owned by Rudolph was not, in fact, “involved in the accident.”
__________________________
[1] Although MCL 500.3114(6) refers to “an exclusion under section 3109(2)” instead of to “an exclusion under section 3109a(2), the Court of Appeals held that this was obviously a scriveners error and that the Legislature clearly intended for MCL 500.3114(6) to refer to MCL 500.3109a(2). The Court of Appeals conclusion in this regard is clearly correct, since MCL 500.3109(2) does not contain any exclusion and, thus, a contrary interpretation would render ineffective and meaningless MCL 500.3114(6)’s removal from the order of priority “a policy . . . as to which an exclusion . . . applies.”