In Copeland v Allstate Ins Co, plaintiff Kermit Copeland was injured in a February 2021 hit-and-run accident while a passenger in an uninsured vehicle as a passenger. The plaintiff himself did not maintain automobile insurance. Approximately 17 years before the accident, plaintiff briefly resided with his sister and brother-in-law at the “Judd address” for approximately three months. He testified that he was homeless for approximately 10 to 15 years between staying at the “Judd address” and the accident, although he continued using the Judd address for mail and on his Michigan identification card. He maintained that he did not actually live there, did not keep his belongings there, and had no intention of returning to reside there. Plaintiff later provided an affidavit identifying multiple residences he occupied after leaving the Judd address and before becoming homeless, including several years living with his mother at the “Seymour address.” After the accident, plaintiff primarily recovered at the “Seymour address.”
In his Michigan Assigned Claim Plan (“MACP”) application for PIP benefits, plaintiff listed the Judd address and identified his sister as someone living in his household. However, the Auto Owners insurance policy, which covered the plaintiff’s sister and brother-in-law, did not list the plaintiff as a household resident or insured driver.
Allstate Insurance Company, the insurer assigned to plaintiffs’ claim by the MACP, moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the plaintiff remained domiciled at the Judd address because he failed to establish a new domicile after leaving that residence. Under this theory, Auto-Owners would be a higher-priority insurer responsible for PIP benefits.
The trial court agreed, after analyzing the Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675; 333 NW2d 322 (1983) domicile factors, concluding that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address. Specifically, the trial court relied heavily on the plaintiff’s familial relationship with his sister and brother-in-law, the plaintiff’s use of the Judd address for mail and identification documents, and the court’s belief that the plaintiff had not established another identifiable domicile. Because the court reasoned that an individual must have a domicile, and plaintiff could not provide evidence of a domicile other than the Judd address, the court deemed the Judd address to be plaintiff’s domicile.
The Michigan Court of Appeals evaluated the same Workman and Dairyland factors and found that, viewed collectively, they did not strongly support a finding that the plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address. Specifically, analyzing the Workman factors, the Court found that the intent-to-remain factor weighed against domicile at the Judd address because plaintiff expressly testified that he had no intention of living there and had only stayed there briefly, approximately 17 years earlier. Further, plaintiff’s relationship with his sister, and his brother-in-law was informal and distant. Plaintiff also did not keep any possessions at his sister’s home.
Analyzing the Dairyland factors, the court concluded that Plaintiff used the Judd address for mail and official documents, but Plaintiff kept no possessions there, did not have a room at the residence, and there was no evidence his sister and brother-in-law financially supported him.
The Court’s analysis reasoned that homeless or transient individuals may still present triable factual disputes regarding domicile, that courts may not simply assign domicile based on the absence of another clearly identifiable domicile, and that supplemental affidavits clarifying deposition testimony may create factual disputes sufficient to defeat summary disposition. In this case, a question of fact existed as to where plaintiff was domiciled at the time of his accident, and therefore a jury must decide the question.
This published decision highlights the importance of developing a complete factual record regarding a claimant’s intent as to their residence, their living arrangements, where their possessions are kept, their financial dependence, and the duration of residency, before seeking dispositive relief on priority issues.
