April 15, 2026
In the published decision of Davis v Baldini, the Court of Appeals determined that a question of fact exists as to whether the regular use of a motor vehicle translates equites to proprietary and possessory use rendering someone a constructive owner under the Michigan No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). In Davis, Plaintiff Davis was driving her daughter’s car through an intersection in Detroit when Defendant Baldini ran a red light and struck her vehicle. Davis sued Baldini for negligence, seeking economic and noneconomic damages. The vehicle driven by Davis was titled to Davis’ daughter and it was insured under a No-Fault policy issued to her daughter. Davis was specifically listed as an excluded driver under that insurance policy.
Davis’ deposition testimony established that she regularly used the vehicle to drive her daughter to and from work at the airport, about four times per week. After dropping her daughter off, Davis would drive home and wait until it was time to pick her daughter up. Davis never used the car for her own errands and relied on others for transportation if she needed to go somewhere.
Baldini moved for summary disposition arguing: (1) Davis was an excluded driver, and therefore, the vehicle was effectively uninsured while she was driving it; (2) Davis was the constructive owner of the vehicle because she had regular use of it, MCL 500.3101; and (3) as an owner of an uninsured vehicle, she was barred from recovering noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c). The Circuit Court agreed and granted summary disposition in favor of Baldini, dismissing Davis’ claims for economic and non-economic damages.
On appeal, Davis only challenged the dismissal of her non-economic damages claim, asserting that she was not a constructive owner of her daughter’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that a factual dispute existed as to whether Davis’ use of the vehicle amounted to ownership. The Court noted that Davis only used the car to transport her daughter to work, she did not use the car for personal errands, the vehicle remained parked at home while her daughter worked, Davis relied on others if she needed transportation, and Davis did not have her own set of keys. The Court emphasized that Davis’ use could reasonably be viewed as solely for her daughter’s benefit, not possessory and proprietary use like an owner, MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). The Court reversed and remanded the matter for further consideration as to whether Davis had sustained a threshold injury under MCL 500.3135(1).